1. Recent scholarship has clearly identified the Papal States and its larger communities as active and creative participants both in the European state building process and in the financial revolution of the early modern period. In establishing firmer control over territories in Central Italy the Papacy was able to bank on Italian city republics tradition, which Popes managed to update and recast in the context of a territorial state. The impersonal character attributed to the state by republican regimes was well suited to the Papacy, as an electoral monarchy. This paper will argue that the 16 th century Papacy succeeded in forging a new fiscal pact between central and local authorities. Blending conservatism and innovation the papacy promoted a contractual approach: central authority established its exclusive right to impose tributes while local powers were granted a large degree of autonomy in selecting fiscal instruments, the types of wealth to be taxed and the means of collecting resources.
From the mid-15 th century the Papacy was engaged in two difficult intertwined struggles: to consolidate its Italian domains -threatened by external aggression as well as internal anarchy -and to shore up its finances sapped by involvement in costly wars and the drying up of the flow of "spiritual" revenues from all over 2. As Popes succeeded to establish stricter control over their territories in Central Italy, the system of taxation was subject to considerable revision, designed to extract more resources, to establish centrally controlled bureaucratic procedures and to introduce a degree of equality and uniformity. However, efforts did not meet with equal success in the three areas.
From the early decades of the 16 th century it was apparent a concerted effort at establishing administrative rights, at asserting fiscal sovereignty and at casting a more effective fiscal net across Papal lands. Since nearly all taxation was administered and exacted at the municipal level, existing fiscal rights and procedures had to be documented and, possibly, revised. Roughly between the 1530s and the 1550s local authorities across the land produced and submitted a tremendous wealth of descriptions of existing municipal rights and practices. For instance on 10 March 1555 the Senate of Bologna submitted to the approval of Pope Julius III a thorough documentation of all tributes levied in the city and the territory subject to it. Origins and destination of each tribute were spelled out as well as how it was assessed and collected.
Existing systems of municipal taxation were largely left in place to cover for the costs of local administrations. But the introduction of new taxation as well as additions to existing dues became the exclusive preserve of the sovereign. In practice local boards were subordinated, without exception, to state authority on fiscal matters.
Most new taxation took the form of centrally controlled state-wide tributes. Evidence from surviving balance sheets of the main communities of the Romagna confirms that in the central decades of the 16th century a remarkable shift took place:
revenues raised in the towns of Imola, Ravenna, Forlì and Cesena expanded at a very fast pace. (Fig. 1) . The lion's share of this increase however went to benefit only state coffers, in fact on average the share of state revenues jumped from less than half to about four fifths (Fig. 2) .
More favorable to local authorities was the situation in Bologna, which was able to retain greater autonomy, yet the long-term trend was hardly different.
Between the 1540s and the 1590s the share of fiscal receipts claimed by state climbed from less than 30% to 50%. To handle fiscal resources the Apostolic Chamber relied on a network of provincial treasuries, who were farmed out to merchant bankers. Treasurers guaranteed both a steady flow of resources and payments in advance. In the main local treasurers did not collect taxes but relied on an indirect system: subjects paid dues to local authorities who in turn paid taxes to provincial treasurers, who were responsible for handling money on behalf of the Apostolic Chamber.
3. Popes recognized the composite nature of the realm they presided and the limits of coercive options. In the main they preferred to advance their sovereignty by consent and cooperation through the signing of pacts and agreements rather than by the exercise of dictatorial power. Acceptance of Papal sovereignty did not translate in the dismantling of local governing practices but rather in their updating. In practice Papal absolutism was "limited" and required the active cooperation of local élites.
New state taxation aimed, at least in theory, at introducing relevant innovations, the most important of which was universal application to territories as In its relentless quest to extract ever more resources from its domains the Papacy accepted the mediation of local authorities, leaving actual implementation to local boards. The contractual nature of the relations between Popes and the various components of the state is evident from the ability of communities on assuming responsibilities for the assessment and collection of taxes by means they thought fit.
Nowhere this pattern is more obvious than in Bologna, the second largest city of the Papal States. Annexed in 1506, Bologna was able to secure terms, which granted civic authorities considerable latitude for independent action and guaranteed that Papal will would be mediated through city offices. Deference and loyalty to the Pope/king paid handsome dividends.
Not surprisingly fiscal geography mirrored power relations within the state, among and within communities, rather than taxable wealth. The triennale was assessed for 62,000 scudi in the Marca but for 42,000 in Umbria, despite the fact that the latter had more inhabitants (300,000 against 280,000) and an overall more prosperous urban economy. Even more spectacular the advantage enjoyed by the Legazione of Bologna, which was charged just 12,000 scudi, despite a population in excess of 200,000. Within provinces differences could be equally disturbing: in Romagna Faenza, Forlì and Cesena paid 5,060, 4,370 and 6,095 respectively although both their economic conditions and overall population were roughly the same. Substantial differences in treatment characterized urban and rural areas, as well as different social groups within cities. In the main country folks and urban lower classes ended up shouldering most of the burden.
4. As temporal revenues soared so did the ability of the Apostolic Chamber to mobilize additional financial resources through borrowing. From the mid-16 th century onward the largest single charge on Papal income was the servicing of the debt, which at mid-17 th century absorbed a about 60% of total income collected.
The new system of Papal debt proved to be remarkably efficient. It generated an ever larger number of issues which were run separately. This said it has to be noticed that Papal financial needs rose faster than fiscal income and despite the declining cost of borrowing the weight of debt servicing rose dangerously, absorbing two thirds of revenues by the 1670s.
5. Success in expanding and modernizing state finance in the 16 th century came at a price. It underscored the contractual nature of relations. Papal predicament was that the cornerstone of the new system -close cooperation with local élite -stood in the way of further advances. Municipal as well as class privilege persisted. Papal attempts to widen the state fiscal base and to introduce more equitable forms of taxation made little headway, precisely because they required the coopeartion of the very groups that had most to lose from fiscal reforms. By the mid-17 th century, as the system approached its upper limits the contractual character of Papal power ceased to be an asset to become an insuperable barrier to both greater financial integration and economic development.
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